The introduction of MFP represents a philosophical turning point in U.S. drug pricing—shifting negotiation from private discussions between pharmaceutical manufacturers and payers with oversight from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") to a public instrument between manufacturers and CMS and the Trump Administration. Yet the underlying question remains: did/can/should/could transparency alone alter behavior within a rebate-driven system?
The central question is whether a public, negotiated ceiling price can reshape a rebate-driven architecture that rewards predictability over disruption. Early evidence suggests the answer is: not yet.
The IRA was positioned as a transformative policy—one designed to balance affordability for patients and savings for the government with sustainability for innovation. At its core, the law introduced the concept of the MFP, establishing a government-negotiated ceiling price for select Medicare drugs beginning in 2026. These prices were expected to catalyze new access dynamics, rebalance power in manufacturer–payer negotiations, and redefine how "value" is operationalized in drug coverage decisions.
Yet as the first negotiated drugs move toward implementation, early formulary data suggest a different reality—one of parity rather than preference within the medicare formulary landscape. The MFP program may have lowered nominal prices, but it has not yet shifted the architecture of access.
As shown in the table below, MFPs for the first 10 high-expenditure Part D drugs range from a 79% discount to a 38% discount off the 2023 List Price. This cohort also functions as a stress test: if MFP cannot move placement in these well-rebated, high-spend classes, it is unlikely to do so in lower-spend categories without complementary contractual innovation.
Table 1: First 10 Negotiated Drugs MFP
| Drug Name | Participating Drug Company | Commonly Treated Conditions | Agreed to Negotiated Price for 30-day Supply for CY 2026 | List Price for 30-day Supply, CY 2023 | Discount of Negotiated Price from 2023 List Price | Total Part D Gross Covered Prescription Drug Costs, CY 2023 | Number of Medicare Part D Enrollees Who Used the Drug, CY 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Januvia | Merck Sharp Dohme | Diabetes | $113.00 | $527.00 | 79% | $4,091,399,000 | 843,000 |
| Fiasp; Fiasp FlexTouch; Fiasp PenFill; NovoLog; NovoLog FlexPen; NovoLog PenFill | Novo Nordisk Inc | Diabetes | $119.00 | $495.00 | 76% | $2,612,719,000 | 785,000 |
| Farxiga | AstraZeneca AB | Diabetes; Heart failure; Chronic kidney disease | $178.50 | $556.00 | 68% | $4,342,594,000 | 994,000 |
| Enbrel | Immunex Corporation | Rheumatoid arthritis; Psoriasis; Psoriatic arthritis | $2,355.00 | $7,106.00 | 67% | $2,951,778,000 | 48,000 |
| Jardiance | Boehringer Ingelheim | Diabetes; Heart failure; Chronic kidney disease | $197.00 | $573.00 | 66% | $8,840,947,000 | 1,883,000 |
| Stelara | Janssen Biotech, Inc. | Psoriasis; Psoriatic arthritis; Crohn's disease; Ulcerative colitis | $4,695.00 | $13,836.00 | 66% | $2,988,560,000 | 23,000 |
| Xarelto | Janssen Pharms | Prevention and treatment of blood clots; Reduction of risk for patients with coronary or peripheral artery disease | $197.00 | $517.00 | 62% | $6,309,766,000 | 1,324,000 |
| Eliquis | Bristol Myers Squibb | Prevention and treatment of blood clots | $231.00 | $521.00 | 56% | $18,275,108,000 | 3,928,000 |
| Entresto | Novartis Pharms Corp | Heart failure | $295.00 | $628.00 | 53% | $3,430,753,000 | 664,000 |
| Imbruvica | Pharmacyclics LLC | Blood cancers | $9,319.00 | $14,934.00 | 38% | $2,371,858,000 | 17,000 |
Note: Numbers other than prices are rounded to the nearest thousands. List prices are rounded to the nearest dollar and represent the Wholesale Acquisition Costs (WACs) for the selected drugs based on 30-day supply using CY 2022 prescription fills. Drug companies' participation in the Negotiation Program is voluntary; the figures above represent estimates based on continued drug company participation in the Medicare program.
The initial cohort of negotiated drugs spans cardiovascular, diabetes, oncology, autoimmune, and hematology categories. They include Eliquis, Xarelto, Jardiance, Januvia, Farxiga, Imbruvica, Stelara, Enbrel, Fiasp, and Entresto. These therapies were chosen based on Medicare spend, duration on market, and lack of generic or biosimilar competition. In practice, these selections represent both the highest fiscal burden and the most entrenched rebate ecosystems in Part D.
This diverse list serves as a useful lens for understanding early formulary reactions and how the medicare part D formulary is adapting to the IRA’s policy changes.
An analysis of 2026 PDP formularies across leading plans—including Silverscript (Aetna), Wellcare, AARP, Humana, and Kaiser Permanente—shows that MFP drugs are not receiving preferential placement compared to competitors. In fact, the data indicate consistent parity in both tiering and utilization management (UM) restrictions.
Across all major PDPs, MFP drugs maintain the same or equivalent tier as competitors—typically Tier 3 or Tier 5, depending on class. This trend indicates that despite lower negotiated prices, plans are not yet translating those savings into improved formulary positioning – a pattern consistent across the part D formulary landscape.
| Comparison Category | Plan Count | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| In line | 5 | No plans show MFPs with better placement |
| MFP superior | 0 | No advantage in tiering detected |
| Competitor superior | 0 | No plans disadvantaged MFPs |
Detailed findings for the formulary of each Negotiated Drug (“ND”) and their competitors in key Medicare plans are as follows:
Diabetes
| IRA ND | IRA ND | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plan Name | Januvia/ Farxiga/ Jardiance | Fiasp / Novolog | Ozempic | Mounjaro | Rybelsus | Invokana | Brenzavvy |
| Silverscript Choice (Aetna) | T3; QL | T3 | T3; PA, QL | T3; PA, QL | T3; PA, QL | Not found | Not found |
| Wellcare Value Script | T3; QL | T3 | T6; PA, QL | T6; PA, QL | T6; PA, QL | T4; QL | Non-formulary |
| AARP Medicare Rx Preferred | T3; QL | T3 | T3; PA, QL | T3; PA, QL | T3; PA, QL | Not found | Not found |
| Humana Value Rx PDP | T3; QL | T3 | T3; PA, QL | T3; PA, QL | Not found | Not found | Not found |
| Kaiser Permanente Senior Advantage | T3; QL | T3 | T3; PA | Not found | Not found | Not found | Not found |
Psoriasis/Psoriatic Arthritis
| IRA ND | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plan Name | Stelara /Enbrel | Skyrizi | Taltz | Tremfya | Cosentyx | Entyvio | Rinvoq | Otezla |
| Silverscript Choice (Aetna) | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | Not found | T5; PA, QL | Not found | Not found | T5; PA, QL | Not found |
| Wellcare Value Script | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | Non-formulary | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | Not found | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL |
| AARP Medicare Rx Preferred | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL | Not found | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL | Not found | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL |
| Humana Value Rx PDP | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | Not found | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | Not found | T5; PA, QL | Not found |
| Kaiser Permanente Senior Advantage | T5; PA | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5; PA |
Blood Clots
| IRA ND | Competitor | |
|---|---|---|
| Plan Name | Eliquis/ Xarelto | Savaysa |
| Silverscript Choice (Aetna) | T3; QL | Not found |
| Wellcare Value Script | T3; QL | Non-formulary |
| AARP Medicare Rx Preferred | T3; QL | Not found |
| Humana Value Rx PDP | T3; QL | Not found |
| Kaiser Permanente Senior Advantage | T3 | Not found |
Blood Cancer
| IRA ND | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | Competitor | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plan Name | Imbruvica | Zydelig | Calquence | Brukinsa | Jaypirca |
| Silverscript Choice (Aetna) | T5; PA, QL, LD | T5; PA, QL, LD | T5; PA, QL, LD | T5; PA, QL, LD | T5; PA, QL, LD |
| Wellcare Value Script | T5; PA, QL, LA | T5; PA, QL, LA | T5; PA, QL, LA | T5; PA, QL, LA | T5; PA, QL |
| AARP Medicare Rx Preferred | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL | T5; PA, QL, DL |
| Humana Value Rx PDP | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL | T5; PA, QL |
| Kaiser Permanente Senior Advantage | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5 | T5 |
The parity observed is neither accidental nor purely political—it is the predictable outcome of entrenched payer infrastructure and the sequential nature of formulary decision-making. The IRA’s MFP mechanism was conceived to introduce pricing transparency and equitable access; however, its translation into real-world coverage reflects how Part D plans, PBMs, and GPOs integrate new pricing benchmarks within established contracting, compliance, and value-assessment frameworks. Three reinforcing dynamics appear to explain the lack of differential placement observed across the 2026 formularies:
Pre-existing low net prices and mature contracting environments.
Many of the first-wave MFP categories—anticoagulation, diabetes, and inflammatory disease—were already characterized by mature rebate structures and low net effective prices. By the time government negotiation began, the commercial market had extracted most available margin via multi-year contracts and competitive class rebating. As a result, the incremental discount introduced by MFP was additive in name only; it did not materially alter the economics governing tier selection. Payers—accustomed to deep gross-to-net spreads—did not view MFP as sufficiently disruptive to justify re-tiering or removal of UM.Category coverage requirements and competitive symmetry.
CMS requires PDPs to maintain coverage of at least two agents per therapeutic class. This compresses the potential delta between 'preferred' and 'standard' placement—especially where competition is dense and substitutability is high. Plans achieve compliance by balancing inclusion, not exclusion, ensuring representation without conferring overt preference. Even a lower net-cost option rarely displaces peers absent clear clinical differentiation or outsized contracting incentives; parity thus reflects an intentional compliance-anchored design rather than passivity.Timing, communication, and operational lag.
The calendar of formulary planning does not align with the cadence of federal negotiation. Most 2026 formularies were drafted or finalized before PDPs received verified MFP rate files. Converting those prices into PBM systems, GPO rate cards, and internal models required additional months. MFP data functioned more as a retrospective input than a proactive lever. By the time it reached committees, tiering and UM decisions were effectively set, leading to a one-year lag in observable market response.Taken together, these forces suggest that MFP’s early impact is more optical than operational. The inertia of contracting cycles, the rigidity of compliance frameworks, and timing misalignment collectively temper its immediate influence on access. The program’s long-term effectiveness may depend less on the authority to negotiate and more on how well outcomes are communicated, timed, and embedded within payer decision processes.
For payers, the next negotiation cycles will likely focus less on list-price delta and more on how manufacturers align those rebates with therapeutic differentiation—particularly through outcomes-based arrangements or evidence-linked rebates.
Manufacturers should assume flat access with tighter net price corridors and shift negotiation energy toward outcomes-based constructs, indication-specific rebates, and evidence-linked guarantees that create contractual reasons to move placement—beyond the MFP signal alone.
For manufacturers, the data underscore a hard truth: MFP participation does not automatically translate into preferred access. The downward pressure on list price compresses revenue but has not yet increased volume. Payers, meanwhile, appear content maintaining equilibrium—leveraging MFP outcomes as negotiation benchmarks without rewriting access logic.
This suggests a future where value communication, clinical differentiation, and contracting strategy will matter more than statutory pricing. The early MFP experience is therefore not a story of disruption, but of reversion to mean—market efficiency overriding policy intent.
The first six months of 2026 will be telling. If patient cost-sharing reductions under MFP pricing drive measurable uptake, payers may recalibrate formulary positions in the next cycle. Conversely, if utilization remains stable, the MFP program may stand as a symbolic victory without a structural one.
CultPAVE powered by MME will continue tracking PDP-level claim activity in these therapeutic areas and will issue an update in mid-2026. The key metric will be not list price, but realized patient access and adherence.